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Abstract In this paper, we present a theory of strategic positioning that explains scien-
tists’ strategic behavior in knowledge transfer from university to industry. The theory is
based on the drivers strategic interdependence and organizational autonomy and entails
three modes of behavior of scientists: mode1, mode2, and mode3 (the research entrepre-
neur). The results of an empirical study conducted at a research institute for nanotech-
nology show that, to increase the likelihood of scientists engaging in knowledge transfer to
industry, scientists need to have a high need for autonomy (expressed in decision-making
on collaboration with industry and join research projects) and a high need for interde-
pendence (expressed in the need for resources such as knowledge, skills, facilities, etc.).
Scientists’ academic and industry orientations do not change the effect of the strategic
positioning theory on the likelihood of engagement with industry, nor the likelihood of
knowledge transfer. The strategic positioning theory explains 43 % of the variance, i.e.
there is a firm foundation for managerial practices for different scientist modes of strategic
behavior.
Keywords Knowledge transfer  Mode1  Mode2  Mode3  Research entrepreneur 
Academic orientation  Industry orientation
1 Introduction
Knowledge transfer, academic entrepreneurship, and the university’s third mission have
become substantial parts of university institutional strategy. As Olmos-Penuela et al.
(2014) show, knowledge transfer activities are now studied in the social sciences, as the
social sciences and humanities became more aware of the need to transfer knowledge to
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industry. Much has been said about universities that engage in entrepreneurial activities
such as patenting, new venture creation and support, innovation network creation, etc. (for
an overview of the field, see Rothaermel et al. 2007). However, this knowledge domain is
still in its infancy, as witnessed by the lack of a theory that can explain which conditions
lead to successful knowledge transfer from university to industry (Rothaermel et al. 2007).
There is a need to explain ‘‘the determinants of research productivity and the impact of
inventions and commercialization activities’’ (Buenstorf 2009). In this study, we seek to
deliver and test a theory that draws knowledge transfer boundary conditions by scientists to
industry.
The literature has mainly focused on outcomes rather than on the management of
relationships between the university and industry. Entrepreneurial activities of scientists or
universities are often measured by for instance number of patents, number of spinoffs,
contract research, industry training courses, consulting, obtaining grants from external
sources, number of graduates, or creating knowledge parks in the case of universities
(Louis et al. 1989; Klofsten and Jones-Evans 2000; Arundel and Geuna 2004; Debackere
and Vleugels 2005; D’Este and Patel 2007; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas 2008). While we
acknowledge that knowledge transfer means much more than collaboration with industry,
we focus here on scientists’ behavior, and test these with engagement with industry as the
primary possible outcome variable. The phenomenon of engagement in collaboration with
industry implies that scientific results can be commercialized further, either by a company
involved in research or by scientists. It also implies active co-creation of scientific
knowledge. Perkmann et al. (2013) state that academic engagement, i.e. relationships
between scientists and non-academic organizations, is far more frequent than commer-
cialization of research, since it is closer to academic research and thus more agreeable to
scientists.
In this paper, we take a managerial perspective on knowledge transfer from academia
and ask the following questions: What conditions make scientists explore and exploit
possibilities of alliances with industry? What are the managerial conditions for optimizing
knowledge transfer in collaboration with industry?
For several decades, it has been a priority of many governments to increase knowledge
transfer from academia to industry. This has been more or less successful. Some gov-
ernment initiatives proved to be productive; these include the National Science Founda-
tion’s engineering research centers (ERCs) in the US (Feller, Ailes, and Roessner 2002),
while some—such as the UK Genomics Parks (Swan et al. 2007) have failed. These mode2
government initiatives (Gibbons et al. 1994) gave industry a central position, stressing the
importance of societally relevant knowledge as a panacea to the ivory tower (mode1)
research type that produces knowledge purely in the academic context. We argue that the
failure of the UK initiative was caused by a mismatch between the expectations and
behavior of scientists and managerial strategies and practices. The UK government
approached scientists in the framework of mode2 (Gibbons et al. 1994), leaving scientists
little autonomy. However, mode2 is not the only behavior mode that can be observed
among scientists (Kurek et al. 2007). The assumption that there is one and only one way to
manage knowledge transfer is therefore bound to lead to failure. The notion that one size
does not fit all is not new in research policy. For instance, Perkmann et al. (2011a) argue
for ‘‘differentiated approaches’’ to university-industry interactions based on their findings
that each scientific discipline needs separate management practices. In this paper, we hold
that each scientist behavior mode requires a tailored management approach.
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2 Knowledge transfer from the university to industry
Scientists primarily seek to produce knowledge and disseminate scientific discoveries
among the scientific community (Merton 1957). Transferring knowledge to industry is not
necessarily in their direct interest if it is not encouraged institutionally (e.g. by funding).
The literature reveals that one of the reasons scientists engage with industry is to get access
to industry resources such as facilities (e.g. D’Este and Patel 2007) and knowledge (e.g.
D’Este and Perkmann 2010). A study among nanotechnology scientists in the Netherlands
shows that the main and significant reasons to interact with industry are to solve practical
problems and to get access to industry knowledge (Dervojeda 2012). Academic
entrepreneurship motivated by personal income plays a minor role in prompting academics
to work with industry (D’Este and Perkmann 2010). Companies also establish relationships
with universities to gain access to various types of resources (Perkmann et al. 2011b).
Thus, the need to share resources is seen as a major driver for scientists to step out of their
ivory tower. The question then becomes how to manage those resources and relationships
to create added value.
Research reveals an increase in academia-industry joint ventures (Hall et al. 2001) as
well as in joint scientific publications (Branstetter 2004; Calvert and Patel 2003; Verbeek
et al. 2002). This increase is different across scientific disciplines (Klevorick et al. 1995;
Landry et al. 2007), university departments (Mansfield and Lee 1996; Schartinger et al.
2001), and regions (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Zucker et al. 1998). The distribution of
academic scientists’ activities in collaboration with industry is highly skewed, with just a
few scientists engaged in a large number of interactions (Balconi et al. 2004; Agrawal and
Henderson 2002). The existing literature on knowledge transfer provides answers to
questions on the factors that influence knowledge transfer and industry engagement by
exploring scientists’ institutional environments such as research group characteristics
(Olmos-Penuela et al. 2014), individual characteristics such as faculty quality (Perkmann
et al. 2011a, b), experience with industry (Bercovitz and Feldman 2003), career stage
(Bercovitz and Feldman 2003; Link et al. 2007), as well as grants and contracts with
industry that enhance collaboration between university scientists and companies (Bozeman
and Gaughan 2007). D’Este and Patel (2007) observed past behavior, funds raised, age,
rank, and status, concluding that these individuals’ characteristics have stronger impacts
than the characteristics of their departments or universities. An up-to-date overview of
individual, organizational, and institutional antecedents and consequences of relationships
between scientists and industry by Perkmann et al. (2013) and an extensive literature
analysis on research collaboration by Bozeman et al. (2013) reveal a knowledge gap
concerning the management of relationships. The questions how to manage scientists’
behavior and what the appropriate managerial practices have not yet been answered.
3 Strategic positioning of scientists and hypothesis development
Relationships between scientists, or scientific departments, and industry, as one of many
knowledge and technology transfer channels, are generally established on a temporary
basis between two entities with different expectations. Scientists strive for knowledge
production and dissemination and pursue their career, which is not necessarily significantly
enhanced by connections with industry (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2008). Companies expect
access to knowledge and state-of-the-art technologies as well as applicable research results
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(Perkmann et al. 2011a, b). However difficult this collaboration might be, it has a sub-
stantial added value if managed properly. These relationships can be seen as temporary
strategic alliances that are established to create value. To study them, we explored the
literature on strategic alliances and integration of organizations. The literature reveals that
strategic alliances are established for strategic reasons of increasing competitive advantage,
organizational knowledge, and learning (Gulati 1998), as well as technology development
and transfer of resources and processes between two or more organizations (Narula and
Hagedoorn 1999). Perkmann and Walsh (2007) observed that strategic alliances between
researchers and industry have been gradually evolving from informal ad hoc cooperation to
large-scale long-term alliances. Benefits to scientists from research-industry strategic
alliances include access to laboratory equipment, gaining insights that apply to academic
research, and supplementing research and education funds (Mansfield 1995; Murray 2002).
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1996) found that alliances are more likely to be formed
when both partners are in vulnerable strategic positions (i.e. in need of resources) or when
they both are in strong positions (i.e. have valuable resources to share). We assume that
each partner must be in the possession of heterogeneous and exchangeable valuable
resources, otherwise there would be no incentive to form an alliance. As any other alliance,
these alliances between scientists and industry also need proper management and orga-
nization (e.g. Gueth 2001).
Alliances can be seen as the integration of organizations, with two factors playing a role
in value creation. According to Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), the successful integration
of merging organizations depends on the need for strategic interdependence (sharing of
heterogeneously distributed resources and competences) and the need for organizational
autonomy (making decisions about the organization, its goals, strategy, and culture). It
should be stressed that the relevant factors are not strategic interdependence and organi-
zational autonomy, but the needs for strategic interdependence and organizational auton-
omy. In this case, organizational autonomy describes the autonomy of scientists within the
alliance of academia and industry. The authors state that these needs are a result of the
merging organizations’ goals, and that the successful integration of two organizations
depends on their strategies for a specific integration.
The idea to analyze relationships between university scientists and industry from the
perspective of temporary merging and integrating organizations was inspired by the model
of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). While scientists clearly control fewer resources than
large and complex organizations and do not develop complex strategies to pursue their
ambitions, they do have goals and allocate their resources to implement various strategies
to attain these goals. They also have sufficient autonomy to implement their strategies and
enter into contracts with industry. The model of Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) was
adapted to the level of individual scientists, albeit as part of a department within an
institute, and developed further into the strategic positioning theory, and was successfully
applied in studies on knowledge production (Kurek et al. 2007; Zalewska-Kurek et al.
2010; Lyhne 2012). The results show that knowledge production differs in different
behavior modes. Following up on these studies’ results, we test the theory with knowledge
transfer activities as new dependent variable. If the needs for resources and autonomy
make a difference concerning knowledge production, they might also influence knowledge
transfer. We claim that scientists’ behavior in knowledge transfer can be managed by
research management, which can apply appropriate managerial practices to increase
knowledge transfer.
Strategic positioning theory states that there are four scientist behavior types: mode1,
mode2, mode3, and mode0 (see Fig. 1). These modes are ideal types in the Weberian sense
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and are consequentially continuous because the dimensions are continuous. Mode0, which
means no integration between actors, is not relevant for our purpose, and we will not
discuss it further.
Mode1 is close to what is known in the literature as the ivory tower. Scientists’ char-
acterized by this mode have a high need to pursue their own goals without any need for
external resources. Like Gibbons et al.’s mode1 (1994), these scientists do not engage with
industry; they are interested only in pursuing their academic interests. Mode2 scientists
have a high need for external resources but a low need to make own decisions in their
research. This means that these scientists will depend on their environments in developing
their research more than mode1 scientists. The mode2 type is close to Gibbons et al.’s
mode2 (1994) or strategic research (Ziman 1991), where there is much involvement by
government and large multinational corporations in the knowledge production system.
While we use close, the modes proposed by Gibbons et al. (1994) were not based on a
managerial framework, but sought to describe what the authors observed as taking place in
the science system.
Mode3 characterizes entrepreneurial scientists, who interact with their environments to
share resources and are also driven by a high need for own decision-making in their
research.
Assuming scientists’ rationality, decisions regarding research are driven by scientists’
goals. While scientists strive for maximum autonomy (Ziman 1991; Aghion et al. 2008),
they might still give up some of their autonomy and might have to accept more interde-
pendence, if this were desirable to them, e.g. to attain their research or career goals. A
research direction can seek to serve a particular purpose of the industrial partner’s or the
institution’s strategy. Blumenthal et al. (1996) show that lifescience scientists in the US
receiving industry support say that their research topic choices are influenced by a project’s
commercial potential. Zalewska-Kurek et al. (2010) showed that the higher the need is to
make autonomous decisions in research (together with a high need for strategic interde-
pendence), the higher the knowledge production is. Here, industry is considered as a means
to do research by providing access to needed resources and, often, co-creating research
results. We claim that, just as in knowledge production, scientists need to make decisions
Fig. 1 Managerial modes of behavior
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regarding collaborative research projects to engage with industry. Projects in which sci-
entists have very little to say are not attractive.
As outlined earlier, sharing heterogeneous resources is a necessary condition for an
alliance. This approach is usually applied to commercial enterprises, but rarely explicitly
and in its entirety to university research settings (Van Rijnsoever et al. 2008). Resources
usually refer to human and social capital that leads to increased research collaboration (e.g.
de Price and Solla 1966; Van Rijnsoever et al. 2008). External resources such as funding
are seen as opportunities for new initiatives (Auranen and Nieminen 2010). Scientists who
interact with industry have a high need for interdependence on their environment, because
they wish to gain access to resources and to acquire visibility and a reputation (Bozeman
and Corley 2004; Reagans et al. 2004; Reagans and Zuckerman 2001; Oh et al. 2006). As
argued above, access to resources is the main driver for establishing relationships with
industry, and we hypothesize that a higher need for strategic interdependence will lead to
more engagement with industry and thus knowledge transfer. Thus:
H1: The higher the needs for organizational autonomy and for strategic interdependence
are, the higher the likelihood of knowledge transfer will be.
It may be noted that this hypothesis automatically covers the other modes as well,
because as we observed before, the modes are continuous. So the analysis of the data will
indicate the optimum linear combination of strategic interdependence and organizational
autonomy for scientists in order to be most productive in knowledge transfer. By formu-
lating hypothesis 1 in this way, we want to stress that we expect that mode3 scientists, or
entrepreneurial scientists, are most productive in knowledge transfer, as also observed in
knowledge production. The reason we do so, is that entrepreneurial scientists are more
likely to create demand for their scientific product, thereby increasing the unicity of
successful scientific products created in the alliance.
3.1 The effects of academic rank and career orientation
There are a number of supplementary and competing factors in the literature that affect
knowledge transfer. A distinction is usually made between institutional characteristics and
individual characteristics. In this paper, we focus on factors related to individual charac-
teristics of scientists. Past behavior of individual scientists in participating in knowledge
transfer (Bercovitz and Feldman 2003; Clarysse et al. 2011; D’Este and Patel 2007) as well
as their career stage (Bercovitz and Feldman 2003; Link et al. 2007), funds raised, age,
rank, and status (D’Este and Patel 2007), as well as opportunity recognition capacity
(Clarysse et al. 2011) have shown some positive influences on knowledge transfer activ-
ities undertaken by scientists.
If the strategic positioning theory stands, these factors found in the literature should just
add some explained variance.
D’Este and Patel (2007) found a significant positive effect of academic status on variety
of interactions with industry. The authors state that the higher a scientist’s rank, the more
likely it is that he or she will engage in interactions with industry. D’Este and Perkmann
(2010) also found that senior scientists engage more frequently in joint or contract research
and consulting. Junior scientists are seen to engage in more varied interactions with
industry (D’Este and Patel 2007). They suggest that this might indicate that junior sci-
entists consider establishing relationships with industry as building their reputation, while
senior scientists capitalize on their network and already gained reputation to access
resources for new research directions (ibidem).
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In strategic positioning theory, academic rank (usually correlated with age in the lit-
erature) is not a separate driver of organizational autonomy, but one of the indicators of
organizational autonomy, as we explain later in the measurement section. The higher the
position is, the more autonomy a scientist has gained. In the literature, academic rank is
seen as a separate factor with a direct effect on knowledge transfer.
Past experience in collaborative research with industry or commercialization of
knowledge is seen as an influencing factor for engaging in knowledge transfer. Clarysse
et al. (2011) show that scientists with entrepreneurial experience are more likely to engage
in other business ventures. Experience in joint research projects with companies also
increases the likelihood of continued engagement with industry (D’Este and Patel 2007).
According to strategic positioning theory, the needs for interdependence and autonomy
are affected by scientists’ goals and strategies of scientists. Thus, we add scientists’ career
orientations into the equation. A scientist’s orientation refers to their attitudes towards their
careers, but not exclusively to career goals. Scientists oriented towards industry either have
experience in collaborating with industry or working for industry, or are inclined to work
for industry. A study by Dietz and Bozeman (2005) indicates that career diversity (i.e. job
experience in academia and in industry) and industry funding affect scientists’ patent
productivity. The evidence from the literature suggests that industry-oriented scientists will
recognize opportunities for knowledge transfer and the accompanying benefits for their
career. Thus:
H2: Industry career orientation positively affects the effects of both the needs for
strategic interdependence and organizational autonomy on knowledge transfer activities.
Furthermore, we argue that scientists oriented only towards their scientific development
are less likely to recognize collaborative research opportunities with industry and that this
will negatively impact the relationship between strategic positioning dimensions and
knowledge transfer. Thus:
H3: Academic career orientation negatively affects the effects of the needs for strategic
interdependence and organizational autonomy on knowledge transfer activities.
4 Methods
4.1 Sample and data collection
The data for this research were collected at the MESA? Institute for Nanotechnology at
the University of Twente, the Netherlands. This large research institute is renowned in an
international, competitive environment with 500 employees, of whom 275 are Ph.D.s or
post-Docs. MESA?’s scientific disciplines include physics, electrical engineering,
chemistry, and mathematics. Besides its scientists’ expertise, the institute is well known for
having excellent nanolaboratory facilities and research equipment that are also outsourced
for industry use. MESA? acquires 60 % of its revenue competing for external sources. The
institute, as part of an entrepreneurial university, has created an environment for spinoffs in
the microtechnology and nanotechnology industry. To date, there are over 40 high-tech
startups and a targeted program for cooperation with SMEs set up especially for startups.
MESA? works with startups to promote knowledge transfer. Because of this institutional
support, we expect a higher likelihood of knowledge transfer activities than in a less
entrepreneurial context. Individuals are more likely to get involve with industry if they are
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trained at institutions that are active in technology transfer (Bercovitz and Feldman 2008).
This should only affect the overall likelihood levels of activities in strategic alliances for
knowledge transfer.
The data were gathered in semi-structured face-to-face interviews with scientists. The
sample of 39 respondents covered the entire spectrum of scientific positions, ranging from
Ph.D. students, post-Docs, assistant professors, professors, and scientific disciplines pre-
sent in the institute. Before the interviews, we checked the scientists’ profiles in order to
prepare tailored-made questions that investigate equivalent aspects of strategic positioning.
4.2 Measurement of knowledge transfer
We base our measurement of engagement in knowledge transfer here on the entrepre-
neurial process defined by opportunity recognition, exploration, and exploitation to create
value (Singh 2001; Shane and Venkataraman 2000, 2001). Scientists collaborate with
industry to support and combine academic goals with knowledge transfer by sharing
resources with partners or to advance their career in academia and/or industry (Lam 2007).
They may or may not be directly involved in commercialization or company formation
activities, but their activities can be restricted to producing research results.
Here, we consider three broad stages of the entrepreneurial process: opportunity
exploration, preparation, and exploitation (see Table 1). In opportunity exploration, sci-
entists are interested in forming a strategic alliance that complements or is an alternative to
their relationships with their peers. Opportunity exploration involves opportunity recog-
nition steps such as getting into contact with a partner to for instance exchange knowledge
or to get funding. Opportunity preparation involves the preparatory steps such as negoti-
ating about the particular conditions of a contract and entering into a contract. Scientists
explore opportunities if they actually enter into relationships with industry to conduct joint
research projects or if they create a spinoff. The exploration–exploitation framework in
strategic alliances was previously used in a different way that did not relate to individual
entrepreneurship (e.g. Koza and Lewin 1998).
We asked the interviewees open-ended questions about their projects in general and
then probed them about their current or past projects with companies or any other rela-
tionships with industry or the commercialization of knowledge via a spinoff. They were
also asked about their plans regarding collaborative projects. Their answers were then
coded (observed/not observed) according to the scheme outlined in Table 1. The dependent
variable takes the value of 0 if the scientist had no relationships with industry (no
Table 1 Scientists’ knowledge transfer activities
Knowledge transfer
concept
Indicators
No activities (0) No active collaboration with industry, no history of such collaboration, no
intentions to collaborate in future
Exploration (1) Intention to collaborate with industry
Preparation (2) Actively approached potential partners from industry or negotiated contracts with
partners from industry
Exploitation (3) Entered into contracts with partners from industry
Established a spinoff company
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activities), (1) if they seriously plan to establish research relationships with industry, (2) if
they have already actively prepared for joint projects (e.g. by entering into negotiations
with a company), and 3 if they are collaborating with a company or have started their own
company based on their scientific results.
4.3 Measurement of strategic interdependence and organizational autonomy
The needs for strategic interdependence and organizational autonomy are measured by the
states of interdependence and autonomy as perceived by the scientists. In our research,
these states are then evaluated, resulting in the degrees of needs for interdependence and
autonomy.
A scientist’s need for strategic interdependence is defined as the need for access to
heterogeneously distributed strategic resources, assets, and capabilities for performing
research tasks. Resources needed for research are measured as: research facilities, exper-
tise, funds, feedback, knowledge, skills, network, and reputation.
A scientist’s organizational autonomy is defined as the need for freedom from influence
of the environment, freedom from external pressure in for instance formulating tasks (Dill
1958), control of sufficient resources (Collin (in Whitley 1984:12–13)) and self-gover-
nance in deciding about research, research goals, and directions (Kurek et al. 2007). We
measure the need for organizational autonomy here as an objective and subjective need for
organizational autonomy (see Table 2). Objective need refers to the structure of collabo-
ration with industry and more objective aspects of autonomy, such as having a leading role
in a joint project or making decisions in research such as. setting research directions,
whereas the second dimension represents a perceived (thus subjective) view of how col-
laboration with industry affects scientists’ freedom and their research (e.g. restricts
research or delays publications).
An alternative measurement of the need for organizational autonomy is academic rank,
as discussed in the theoretical chapter. Academic rank is considered low for non-tenure
Table 2 Indicators for strategic interdependence and organizational autonomy
Concept Indicators
Need for strategic
interdependence
Access to knowledge and skills
Access to research facilities
Improves a scientist’s reputation
Improves a scientist’s expertise
Network, employment (social capital)
Need for organizational autonomy
Objective Leading role in the project
Deciding on projects (incl. knowledge contribution from industry
partners)
Academic rank
Junior, non-tenured: Ph.D. candidate, post-Doc
Senior, tenured: assistant professor and higher; senior scientist
Subjective Freedom in deciding on deliverables
Restrictions on research
Restrictions on publications
Fulfillment of all roles in the joint industry-university project
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junior staff and high for tenured and other senior staff. Academic rank is also included in
the need for organizational autonomy objective.
We asked open-ended questions about decisions in research, research projects scientists
have been recently involved in, including possible collaborative projects with companies
and which decisions have been made in these projects, and who made them. Questions
were also directed to the reasons for entering into relationships with companies and the
attractiveness of particular relationships, to indicate the need for interdependence. Scien-
tists gave multiple answers to these questions, which were coded in a binary system
(0 = not observed, 1 = observed). We used the answers to define indicators of the needs
for autonomy and interdependence. The separate indicators were coded as low needs (-1)
or high needs (1). Most indicators pointed at high needs for autonomy, with a few pointing
at a low need for autonomy. For instance, when an interviewee mentioned that a short-
coming of working with a company is that it can delay paper submission, this answer was
coded as a low need for autonomy. In this case, a scientist accepts a company request to
intervene in the publication process.
A principal component analysis was executed on the indicator sets of the need for
organizational autonomy and the need for strategic interdependence. The analysis con-
firmed one dimension of interdependence and two dimensions of autonomy. As seen in
Table 3, the need for organizational autonomy is related to scientists’ position (objective)
and their perception (subjective). Table 3 presents the indicator’s loadings on the com-
ponents and the Eigenvalues of the components.
The indicators then were compounded and normalized by dividing by the maximum
number of high need indicators.
Table 3 Factor analysis for the independent variables
Component 1
(objective)
Component 2
(subjective)
Need for organizational autonomy
Deciding about the contract .82
Leading role in the project .64
Academic rank .82
Freedom in a project -.67
Research group is able to fulfill all roles in the project .49
Restrictions on publications .63
Restriction on research .84
Eigenvalue 1.91 1.67
Need for strategic interdependence
Collaboration with companies provides access to knowledge .79
Collaboration with companies provides access to facilities .50
Collaboration with companies improves reputation .41
Collaboration with companies improves a scientist’s network,
provides access to future employment
.57
Collaboration with companies improves a scientist’s expertise .64
Eigenvalue 1.77
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4.4 Measurement of career orientations
Academia orientation is indicated by a scientist’s goals to develop the research group,
excelling in education, interaction with students, and exploring and challenging research.
Industry orientation is indicated by connections with industry, since they result in goals
derived from collaborating with industry. These connections are measured by past or
current employment in industry or the intention to work in industry in the future (see
Table 4).
5 Results
5.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 5 shows that all the entrepreneurial stages are represented in the sample. Half of the
sample explored the possibilities of industry engagement and serious plans to start joint
projects with a company. About 30 % passed this stage and is either engaged in negoti-
ations or already has contract research. Since nanotechnology research requires large
financial resources, scientists are expected to acquire funds from external sources, and it is
unsurprising that many interviewees collaborate with companies or at least intend to do so.
Some of their projects are funded jointly by the government and industry.
We present the distributions of the degrees of the need for organizational autonomy
(OA) and the need for strategic interdependence (SI) in the sample as cumulative distri-
butions in Fig. 2. Since these are cumulative distributions, we can fit them with truncated
normal distributions in this case, as shown by the curves in Fig. 2.
As can be seen in Fig. 2, both fits result in high R2 values, indicating sufficiently
reliable fits. The mean values for the needs for OA and SI are calculated at 50 % of the
range of the variables, and are .46 and .31 respectively; standard deviations are .22 and .26
respectively. We see that, in our sample, about 45 % of respondents are seen to have a need
for autonomy higher than .5, and somewhat less than 30 % of respondents a need for
interdependence higher than .5.
We observe a gap between the distributions of the two dimensions. The scientists in the
sample have a high need for organizational autonomy and, in comparison, a slightly low
need for strategic interdependence.
Table 4 Indicators for career orientations
Concept Indicators
Academia orientation Aim to develop a research group
Aim to excel in education
Interest in advancing the field
Driven by interaction with students
Driven by possibilities of exploring new research
directions and by challenging research
Driven by academic freedom
Industry orientation Goal to spin off a company
Past or current employment in industry
Intention to work in industry
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5.2 Strategic positioning theory
We applied ordinal logistic regression analysis, because the dependent variable is ordinal.1
We have restricted the analysis to a linear combination of the needs for strategic inter-
dependence and organizational autonomy, as our sample size does not allow any higher
order terms in the analysis.
Table 5 Distribution of knowl-
edge transfer activities in the
sample (N = 39)
Knowledge transfer Frequency % Cumulative %
No activities (0) 7 17.9 17.9
Exploration (1) 20 51.3 69.2
Preparation (2) 7 17.9 87.2
Exploitation (3) 5 12.8 100
Total 39 100
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Fig. 2 Distribution of the Need for Organizational Autonomy and the Need for Strategic Interdependence.
The number of observations for both variables is the same, but for the need for strategic interdependence we
have a higher number of coinciding data points, resulting in a lower number of data points shown
1 The dependent variable knowledge transfer (KT) is an interval censored variable. This means that we have
only limited observational information of the position of the respondents on the KT-continuum. We have
observed KT activity levels without knowing the exact position on the continuum (from 0- no activity to 3 –
entering contracts with industry or establishing a spinoff, see Table 1). In an ordinal logistic regression all
observed stages in KT considered are in one estimate. This is done by estimating the log odds of the
cumulative stages of KT:
0 KT not considered log ððproportion 0ð Þ= proportions 1 þ 2 þ 3ð Þð Þ
1 exploration log ððproportions 0 þ 1ð Þ= proportions 2 þ 3ð Þð Þ
2 exploration log ððproportions 0 þ 1 þ 2ð Þ= proportion 3ð Þð Þ
3 exploration proportions 0 þ 1 þ 2 þ 3ð Þ equals 1
In Tables 6 and 8 the log odds are reported as thresholds on the dependent variable KT in which e.g.,
threshold 0 is the log odd of not considering KT at all versus the remainder stages and e.g., threshold 2 is the
log odd of the previous stages versus exploitation.
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The results are presented in Table 6 (correlation matrix in Table 7 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
Model 1 presents strategic positioning theory, and the coefficients show that the needs for
organizational autonomy and strategic interdependence have significant positive impacts
on knowledge transfer probability. Thus, strategic positioning theory is a good predictor for
knowledge transfer. The increase in the need for strategic interdependence increases the
likelihood of a higher knowledge transfer level (going from one threshold to a higher one);
the same is true for the organizational autonomy. Thus, hypothesis 1 is not rejected. The
coefficients indicate that the need for the objective organizational autonomy has a slightly
bigger impact on the likelihood of engaging in knowledge transfer to industry than the need
for subjective autonomy or the need for strategic interdependence. The value of Nagelk-
erke R2 (pseudo R2) is .43, i.e. strategic positioning theory explains about 43 % of the
variance.
5.3 Academic rank
Academic rank is one indicator of autonomy and was included in the measure of objective
autonomy. To test a competing theory, in lieu of autonomy we used academic rank as a
separate explanatory variable (rank is thus not included in this specific measurement of the
Table 6 Ordinal logistic regression of knowledge transfer on strategic interdependence and organizational
autonomy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
Threshold knowledge Transfer (KT) = 0** 1.24 1.35 -1.07 1.46 -.89
Threshold KT = 1 4.74 4.88 1.59 4.97 1.56
Threshold KT = 2 6.23 6.38 2.85 6.46 2.71
Strategic interdependence 2.11*
(1.44)b
2.08*
(1.44)
2.13*
(1.45)
Organizational autonomy objective 3.66*
(1.15)
2.87a*
(1.22)
3.69*
(1.18)
Organizational autonomy subjective 2.26*
(1.08)
2.20*
(1.08)
2.22*
(1.11)
Academic rank .92
(.77)
1.75*
(.66)
Academia orientation .13
(1.57)
2.10*
(1.48)
Industry orientation .40
(1.33)
-.32
(1.24)
-2log likelihood intercept only 87.16 81.33 22.98 95.35 60.54
-2log likelihood model 67.66 62.34 15.93 75.76 58.48
Nagelkerke .43 .43 .18 .43 .06
Percentage correctly predicted 56 51 51 56 51
N 39 39 39 39 39
*One-tailed t test: p\ .10
**Parallel lines tests, which were conducted to check the assumption that the dependent variable is ordinal,
were positive
a Rank is not counted in the measurement of the need for organizational autonomy objective
b Standard errors are corrected for sampling without replacement in a finite population. The original
estimated SE is multiplied by .96 (Cochran 1977:24)
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need for objective organizational autonomy). As seen in Model 2, rank does not have a
significant impact on knowledge transfer. Organizational autonomy’s impact is lower in
Model 2 by almost the coefficient of academic rank. There is no change in the amount of
explained variance compared to Model 1. Academic rank on its own (Model 3) explains
18 % of the variance.
We also ran extra analyses to test how academic rank behaved as an independent
competing factor. The results can be found in Table 8 in the ‘‘Appendix’’. In Model 6,
academic rank plays the role of a proxy of the need for objective organizational autonomy.
Rank’s effect is now significant and almost twice the effect of rank in Model 2. However,
the loss in explanatory power is 9 %. Rank as a proxy of the need for objective and
subjective autonomy (Model 7) again shows a significant positive effect on knowledge
transfer, but the loss in explanatory power is 19 %.
5.4 Industry orientation and academia orientation
Both the industry orientation and academia orientation had small and insignificant impacts
on the likelihood to engage in knowledge transfer (Model 4). Neither of these orientations
changes the independent variables’ impacts on the knowledge transfer variable. This means
that they do not have effects, as hypothesized. Therefore, we had to reject hypotheses 2 and
3. In Model 5, with industry and academia orientations, only academia orientation has a
significant positive direct effect on knowledge transfer. Neither of the two orientations
have a significant effect with academic rank as a separate variable either (model 8).
6 Discussion
This paper presented a theory explaining scientists’ strategic behavior in university to
industry knowledge transfer. With this theory of strategic positioning, we analyzed rela-
tionships between university scientists and industry as strategic alliances established with
the aim of exchanging knowledge, sharing resources, and producing new research results.
We tested strategic positioning theory at a nanotechnology research institute. This
empirical study’s primary conclusion is that strategic positioning theory is not rejected and
is invariant concerning commonly used explanatory factors such as academic and industry
orientations and academic rank. The theory explains 43 % of the variance, which means
that there is a firm foundation for managerial practices for different strategic behavior
modes of scientists. We discuss such practices later in this section.
Our results show that to increase the likelihood of scientists engaging in knowledge
transfer to industry, scientists need resources such as knowledge, expertise, skills, access to
networks, etc. This is consistent with the literature on the motivations of scientists who
engage in relationships with industry (e.g. D’Este and Patel 2007; Perkmann et al. 2009;
D’Este and Perkmann 2010). In addition to this literature stream, our study also shows that
scientists next to these resources also need autonomy to decide about collaboration with
industry and, more importantly, about managing joint research projects. We found that
mode3 represents the optimum linear combination of the needs for strategic interdepen-
dence and organizational autonomy for scientists to transfer knowledge to industry.
Similarly, the research shows that mode2 behavior is less effective concerning knowledge
transfer, because scientists place a high value on their need to decide about their research
and about joining industry-university projects. These results are consistent with our
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previous work on knowledge production, in which we showed that the needs for organi-
zational autonomy and for strategic interdependence positively influence scientists’ sci-
entific output.
Academic rank has a positive impact on knowledge transfer. We observe that the higher
the rank is, the more likely a scientist is to engage with industry. Academic rank and the
higher autonomy levels that accompany it mirror the experience and resources gained over
the course of action. Junior scientists are bound to the one project they committed to when
they started their Ph.D. research. They need the resources provided in the project, which
had already been already decided on, and—to some extent—autonomy, but they most
likely did not decide on the project’s goals. The more senior a scientist, the more projects
(and, thus, money) need to be accessed, and higher autonomy is therefore needed to decide
with whom relationships should be established so as to achieve certain goals. However, on
its own, academic rank does not have a large impact on the likelihood of knowledge
transfer to industry; it only partially explains the likelihood. We argue that this is so,
because autonomy means much more than seniority, which is just one indicator of
autonomy. Deciding about research goals and the leading role in the project as well as
subjective perceptions of restrictions by a company on a project and academic freedom
have much stronger effects on whether or not scientists engage with industry.
In line with the literature, we assumed that experience with working in industry or an
inclination to work in industry would positively affect the likelihood of industry engage-
ment. However, our research shows that this is not the case. Affiliation with industry does
not significantly change knowledge transfer. One explanation for this might be that the gain
from a relationship with industry in terms of resources is already a sufficient reason to
engage in such a relationship, and that specific career goals do not matter in relation to
knowledge transfer. We have argued that being oriented to a career in academia will
negatively affect the relationship between the needs for autonomy and interdependence,
and knowledge transfer. The results show that, instead, having an academic aspiration can
increase knowledge transfer. This result is in line with the results of D’Este and Perkmann
(2010) in medical disciplines, since they report that academia orientation would increase
the likelihood of entrepreneurial activities if academia orientation is used as a main
variable. However, neither academia orientation nor industry orientation significantly
change the relationship between the need for autonomy and for interdependence and the
likelihood of knowledge transfer. This means that the strategic positioning theory cannot
be rejected by considering these factors.
Following Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), we argue that in order to create value in an
alliance, there is a need to align managerial practices. If a research institute or university
management want to enhance knowledge transfer processes and the engagement of sci-
entists with industry, they need to manage these processes; the same goes for research
policy-makers. A failure to deliver expected results could be caused by a mismatch of
managerial approaches. Each of the proposed managerial modes needs a specific set of
managerial practices. Based on the needs for strategic interdependence and organizational
autonomy, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) propose three integration types: preservation
for mode1, absorption for mode2, and symbiosis for mode3. They suggest a number of
managerial practices that can be translated into each scientist’s behavior type and can then
be used by research managers. The choice of mode depends on research management’s
goals. We will now discuss the goals and suitable practices for each mode.
In preservation, the strategy is to explore the domain, i.e. market or industry in business
terms, to learn from the organization that is being acquired. In mode1, the goal associated
with this behavior type is to learn from scientists. The managerial practice most suitable for
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this type is to leave a scientist to work on their own, since they need much freedom in
pursuing their research. This mode does not necessarily lead to increased knowledge
transfer activities, as mode1 scientists do not have the need to share resources with external
actors. However, as the logistic regression coefficients show, the need for organizational
autonomy (especially the objective component) has more impact on the likelihood of
engaging in knowledge transfer. Research managers need to be able to recognize which
project can and better should be done without direct industry involvement—some projects
can be financed by internal resources. No industry involvement does not mean that research
cannot be commercialized at a later stage.
Mode2 approximates absorption, i.e. a situation where one organization fully integrates
another one to exploit the domain, so as to get a larger market share, increase performance,
increase efficiency, etc. (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991). For research managers, this type
would mean that a company that wishes to fund research is familiar with the research type
to be conducted but seeks facilities and scientists’ expertise. These scientists engage in
interactions with industry for resources and do not need as much autonomy. They might
agree to research goals because it suits their goals. This approximates what is known as
commissioned research. In such a situation, a company financing the research is expected
to be more involved in managing the research.
The most productive mode for knowledge transfer is mode3, as seen in the results. This
mode should be encouraged when it is research managers and the funding company’s
strategy to explore new research directions or new areas of commercialization. This mode
requires more careful management, owing to the simultaneous need for high autonomy by
scientists and the need for extensive resource exchange, and thus collaboration between
university scientists and industry. The involvement of the company financing the project
should be limited to an advisory rather than a leading role. Research goals should be
proposed by scientists and discussed by all parties involved, but the scientist should lead
the project.
The recognition of different modes of scientists is an important result of this study.
Research managers need to realize that there is more to project governance than resource
exchange and rank—scientists have different strategies concerning knowledge transfer and
thus should be managed according to these strategies.
6.1 Limitations and future research opportunities
The main limitation of this research is the study setting. The nanotechnology institute we
used is a special case of an institute that encourages many forms of knowledge transfer.
The university it is associated with is an entrepreneurial university that has created more
than 800 spinoffs over the past 60 years. Therefore, the institute provides facilities for
business development and commercialization of research results and creates a culture that
supports industry relationships. This can result in a bias. However, since we did not ask
about the institutional climate or culture but about established relationships with industry
and scientists’ intentions, the context is of lesser importance. Nevertheless, to further
develop the theory, more research is needed with an international sample and in different
contexts. As noted, research institutes or universities are expected to be entrepreneurial.
Following the resource-based argument, a research institute needs to support and facilitate
knowledge transfer by providing appropriate resources. In the case of hard sciences, these
resources are research facilities that allow the state-of-the-art research development and
will attract industry to collaboration with an institute.
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The results show that, to increase the likelihood of knowledge transfer, research
managers need to increase their scientists’ interdependence and autonomy. These findings
open up possibilities for new managerial practices to stimulate interdependence and
autonomy as well as for new research to test these new practices.
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Appendix
See Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7 Means, standard deviations, and correlation matrix
Mean Std
Deviation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Knowledge transfer 1.256 .910 1
2. Strategic
interdependence
.313 .255 .326 1
3. Organizational
autonomy subjective
.359 .302 .207 -.096 1
4. Organizational
autonomy objective
.556 .345 .569 .426 -.070 1
5. Organizational
autonomy objective
(without rank)
.641 .343 .556 .385 -.025 .914 1
6. Rank .380 .493 .420 .358 -.112 .826 .527 1
7. Industry orientation .427 .241 -.073 -.149 .006 -.152 -.005 -.312 1
8. Academy orientation .380 .206 .168 .147 .180 .220 .214 .163 -.150
Table 8 Ordinal logistic regression of knowledge transfer on strategic interdependence and organizational
autonomy
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Est. (SE) Est. (SE) Est. (SE)
Threshold knowledge Transfer (KT) = 0** .34 -.63 -.16
Threshold KT = 1 3.45 2.23 2.59
Threshold KT = 2 4.8 3.48 3.86
Strategic interdependence 2.63*
(1.36)
2.10*
(1.31)
Organizational autonomy objective
Organizational autonomy subjective 2.33* (1.08)
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